The State\u27s Fortunate 50 by Schmalz, Peter
Labor Research Review 
Volume 1 | Number 21 




The State's Fortunate 50 
Peter Schmalz 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Labor Research Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please 
contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
© 1993 by Labor Research Review 
The State's Fortunate 50 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Reaganomics are alive and well at the state and local levels. Not only are funds tight, but the 
same mean-spirited, anti-worker attitudes that characterized the Reagan administration have become 
increasingly prevalent among state and local government employers. For much of the 1980's, politicians 
were able to satisfy both public sector unions and the taxpayers by negotiating contracts that provided 
reasonable wage and benefit improvement without busting budgets. Today, most public employers 
perceive a direct conflict between the needs of their workers and a public attitude that is both anti-tax and 
anti-government. Like many corporations of the 1980's, public employers now find it easier to scapegoat 
workers and public sector unions than to grapple with the real issues of management responsibility and 
effectiveness. 
The consequence is a dramatic change in public sector bargaining. Where negotiations once were 
focused on achieving gains for workers, they are now all too often dominated by talk of layoffs, 
privatization, wage freezes and insurance or other benefit give-backs. Public sector unions, which once 
were able to achieve good contracts through a combination of strong local union leadership and an 
effective political program, now are joining their brothers and sisters in the private sector in the search for 
more effective strategies to mobilize their members and to pressure their employers. 
The corporate campaign model may be one such tactic. Although the model has been largely developed 
and used in private sector fights, many of the component parts have been used by successful public 
sector unions for years. This tactic offers two major advantages for the public sector fights at the 
bargaining table. The first is that public employers are highly visible and more vulnerable to public 
pressure than their counterparts in the private sector. Second, corporate campaigns provide methods of 
putting direct pressure on the employer while the union seeks to activate and energize the membership. 
AFSCME Council 31 and Local 3700, representing 2,200 clerical and support workers at the University of 
Illinois in Champaign, were forced to use nontraditional tactics to successfully negotiate a first contract. 
Our struggle at the bargaining table demonstrates the effectiveness of corporate campaign-style tactics 
in the public sector. 
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The State's 
Fortunate 50 
AFSCME applies corporate campaign 
to win first contract and parity for workers 
• Peter Schmalz 
Reaganomics are alive and well at the state and local levels. Not only 
are funds tight, but the same mean-spirited, anti-worker attitudes 
that characterized the Reagan administration have become increas-
ingly prevalent among state and local government employers. For 
much of the 1980's, politicians were able to satisfy both public sector 
unions and the taxpayers by negotiating contracts that provided 
reasonable wage and benefit improvement without busting budgets. 
Today, most public employers perceive a direct conflict between the 
needs of their workers and a public attitude that is both anti-tax and 
anti-government. Like many corporations of the 1980's, public 
employers now find it easier to scapegoat workers and public sector 
unions than to grapple with the real issues of management respon-
sibility and effectiveness. 
The consequence is a dramatic change in public sector bargain-
ing. Where negotiations once were focused on achieving gains for 
workers, they are now all too often dominated by talk of layoffs, 
privatization, wage freezes and insurance or other benefit give-backs. 
Public sector unions, which once were able to achieve good contracts 
through a combination of strong local union leadership and an 
• Peter Schmalz is Assistant Director of the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Council 31 based in Chicago, Illinois. 
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effective political program, now are joining their brothers and sisters 
in the private sector in the search for more effective strategies to 
mobilize their members and to pressure their employers. 
The corporate campaign model may be one such tactic. Although 
the model has been largely developed and used in private sector fights, 
many of the component parts have been used by successful public 
sector unions for years. This tactic offers two major advantages for 
the public sector fights at the bargaining table. The first is that public 
employers are highly visible and more vulnerable to public pressure 
than their counterparts in the private sector. Second, corporate cam-
paigns provide methods of putting direct pressure on the employer 
while the union seeks to activate and energize the membership. 
AFSCME Council 31 and Local 3700, representing 2,200 clerical 
and support workers at the University of Illinois in Champaign, were 
forced to use nontraditional tactics to successfully negotiate a first 
contract. Our struggle at the bargaining table demonstrates the 
effectiveness of corporate campaign-style tactics in the public sector. 
FIGHTING BACK THE DECERT 
AFSCME won a narrow victory for 2,200 clerical workers at the 
University of Illinois in August of 1991. The primary issues in the 
campaign were the differences in wages and working conditions 
between university employees and other state workers which 
AFSCME already represented. 
When we got to the bargaining table, it was clear that the U of I 
had no real interest in reaching a settlement and were hostile to the 
whole concept of parity between university employees and other state 
workers. Though the employer was willing to meet on a reasonably 
regular basis, we had to fight about the size of the committee, paid 
time for negotiators, and even about basic language already agreed 
to with other unions on campus. 
The University's stall tactics worked. An organized group of anti-
union employees who had opposed us in the original election were 
able to collect enough signatures to file a decertification petition as 
soon as the election bar was lifted. In addition, the University had 
already announced a four percent increase for other workers on 
campus. We knew that if we settled for the same percentage, the 
union would lose the election, but if we held out, the anti-union 
employees would use it against us, pointing out that other employees 
on campus had already received their raises. 
In order to win the election, we had to raise the stakes at the 
bargaining table. We now had to publicly define our goals so that 
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the majority of employees would believe that the goals were both 
realistic and would represent a significant improvement over the gains 
of other campus workers. In addition, we knew we could not publicly 
portray the administration as anti-union. Our bargaining unit con-
sisted largely of conservative women who had a strong, positive 
identification with the U of I. If we had attacked the University, we 
would have alienated many potential supporters. Instead, we por-
trayed the employer as bumbling and reluctant, rather than hostile 
to our goals. Both of these tactics worked effectively in the election 
campaign which we won by 20 votes. 
Winning the decert campaign, however, did not put us in a strong 
position at the bargaining table. We had successfully raised worker 
expectations, but our slim margin of victory reduced the pressure 
on the University to meet our demands. Moreover, while the elec-
tion campaign had significantly strengthened our local leadership, 
the overall membership was sharply divided and decidedly non-
militant. We had little or no ability to pressure the employer through 
worker actions. 
If we were going to succeed at the bargaining table, we were going 
to have to find another way to put pressure on the U of I. This is 
when we turned to corporate campaign-style tactics. 
PRESSURING THE FORTUNATE 50 
Staff and local leadership analyzed the University's weaknesses and 
the union's strengths. We came up with three potential employer 
weaknesses. The first was the University's own image. Its ability to 
attract quality students and faculty was dependent on maintaining 
a strong reputation across the country and the state, so we knew it 
was extraordinarily sensitive to public criticism. 
The second problem area for the University involved its relation-
ship with the Board of Trustees. In the summer of '92, we succeeded 
in convincing the trustees to pass a resolution supporting parity for 
university workers. To ensure continued support, we targeted two 
pro-labor candidates for the Board of Trustees in the fall statewide 
elections, and they both won. With their impending addition to the 
Board, it was likely that the new chair would be a strong advocate 
for unions and workers. The University knew that the trustees were 
likely to become even more assertive about negotiations if it did not 
settle before then. 
The third area of vulnerability for the University was its relation-
ship with the Illinois legislature. The state provides a significant 
portion of the university budget, including most of the money 
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designated for nonacademic wage increases. U of I had been reason-
ably successful in getting its budgets approved over the years, but 
it had also built up a backlog of resentment because of its unwill-
ingness to be accountable for how it spent the money. 
The union's strengths, aside from good local leadership, were 
effective research and public relations capabilities, a strong presence 
and good reputation in the state legislature, and the ability to garner 
support from some top union and political leaders. We now had all 
of the ingredients for a corporate campaign, but we needed to find 
a way to make effective use of the parity issues. 
AFSCME had already conducted a substantial amount of research 
during the organizing campaign. The key elements of our parity 
arguments at the bargaining table were: our members were paid on 
average 23* less than their counterparts in state agencies; automatic 
step increases had been consistently frozen by the U of I while con-
tinuing for state workers; most state employees worked a 37V2 hour 
work week while university employees continued to work 40; and 
the university civil service definition of seniority—in contrast to the 
state's definition—left workers vulnerable to layoff if they tried to 
move up within the system. 
When we took a look at the university administration, however, 
we discovered that the parity issues were reversed. University admini-
strators consistently made significantly more than their state counter-
parts, even though they had fewer responsibilities. Something else 
was reversed as well: our bargaining unit was 90% female while 100% 
of the top 50 administrators were male; further research revealed of 
the top 120 university administrators, only two were female. 
Our opening shot focused public attention on both of these parity 
issues. We took out full page ads in the local and campus papers 
asking, "What's the most exclusive fraternity at the U of I? The 
Fortunate 50." The ad listed the administrators with their salaries and 
dramatized the fact they were all men. Simultaneously, we held a 
press conference in Springfield where we which revealed our research 
into the parity issues. The ad and the press conference generated 
immediate and intense interest from the media. We received statewide 
coverage and dominated talk radio in Champaign for several days. 
The University's response, which said in effect that there weren't 
enough qualified women around, only added fuel to the fire. 
We also were approached by many female state legislators who 
wanted to know what they could do to help. We had been working 
key legislative leaders on the issue of budgetary accountability for 
some time so that became an obvious focal point to direct their anger. 
The following week the women legislators held a press conference 
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Illinois State Reps. Barbara Flynn Currie and Jan Schakowsky were among 
the 13 female legislators who condemned the U. of I. for its unfair treat-
ment of university clerical workers. Pictured at the press conference, from 
left to right, are Local 3700 President Judy Stoll, AFSCME DC 31 Deputy 
Director, Roberta Lynch, State Rep. Currie, and State Rep. Schakowsky. 
to announce that they had sent a scathing letter to U of I President 
Stanley Ikenberry denouncing the university's treatment of women 
and threatening support for a line-item budget (which would have 
severely restricted the University's historical ability to choose how 
to spend its money without reporting to the legislature) if corrective 
action was not taken immediately. 
During this period, we began a series of worker job actions which 
would attract media attention without requiring large numbers of 
employees to participate. Although many of the employees were not 
very militant, the leadership, which had become very sophisticated 
during the decert campaign, understood the importance of making 
sure the University knew that these were their goals and their fight. 
They attended most press conferences, organized a postcard cam-
paign, held a bargaining day luncheon at the bargaining table, and 
presented a giant Christmas card and caroled the U of I president 
and vice president. Their participation and support were crucial: 
it demonstrated that this was not just a fight between university and 
union officials, but one which seriously affected the lives and jobs 
of university workers. 
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We also kept the pressure on the Board of Trustees and the univer-
sity administration both directly and through supportive political and 
labor leaders. We continued to flood the U of I with Freedom of 
Information requests asking for such data as minority hiring, admini-
strative perks, and expense account information. We were working 
through our members to develop a network of support among 
religious and community leaders, campus organizations, and women's 
groups who were willing to sign on to an ad showing their support 
for our bargaining demands. We also were looking at ways to reach 
out to alumni and grant providers. 
But the University had already had enough. Less than two months 
after we began our campaign, we were able to reach a settlement 
which addressed all of our bargaining goals. The contract was ratified 
by more than three to one, and our membership climbed to over 
75%. Best of all, our victory gave us the ability to build a stronger, 
more militant local before the next contract fight. 
AFSCME Local 3700 members celebrate the long-awaited ratification of 
their first contract with U of I. 
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Although it didn't occur to us at the time to define our strategy 
as a corporate campaign, it did include many of the basic ingredients. 
By focusing intense public pressure on the university's administrators 
and with elected officials acting as the stick, we forced the University 
to agree to issues which we and other unions had been fighting to 
achieve for more than a decade. 
As bargaining in the public sector becomes tougher and tougher, 
public sector unions are using a variety of new and old tactics to 
fight to protect our members. If the U of I contract fight is a useful 
example, applying some of the tactics used by private sector unions 
in their corporate campaigns may be one road to public sector 
success. • 
RESOURCES 
The Human Cost of Contracting Out: A Survival Guide for 
Public Employees by the AFL-CIO Public Employee Dept. 
Public Service Practice Handbook gives strategic and practical 
guidance to help rebuild public services, and resist privatization and 
contracting out. For more information fax request to Public Services 
International at 011-33-5040-7320. 
